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“BP released findings from its own internal investigation of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, revealed
inefficient Organization interfaces among BP management, the rig crew and well site leader. Also
according to the investigation, one important contributor to the accident was inadequate guidelines for
critical tests and operations”. (Pires and Mosleh 2011)
Over the recent past, the accumulation of major mishaps, crises and accidents have made it clear that
organisations must still improve their capabilities to address safety “not as a stand-alone activity that is
separate from the main activities and processes of the organization” but as an integrated part of total
performance management. The requirements for safety management in existing and upcoming standards
and regulations, as for example the ISO 31000 and or the Seveso II directive, call for a proactive strategic
approach, anticipating risks and demonstrating a capacity to keep safety at the centre of changes driven
by commercial competition, and ensuring that safety evidence itself becomes an effective driver of change.
However there is often a gap between the state principles and an actual roadmap to their implementation.
Furthermore organisations, especially the one dealing with safety critical operations, find it difficult to
integrate their different functional units in a common programme of operations management or change;
there is no clear consensus about what it means to be ‘proactive’; there is no integrated framework for
analysing or managing all the human related functions in an operational system.
Innovation may rely on assembling the best practices, tools and methods already available for functional
analysis, risk assessment, interactive emergency scenarios analysis, performance monitoring, design
review, training and knowledge management, in an integrated framework able to address safety
management in the main aspects of a product or process lifecycle the cornerstone of which is the building
of a common operational picture to support the capacity to perform more participatory and dynamic risk
identification and solutions loops in:
- Design (new plants, processes /procedures availing new visualization tools)
- Ad hoc critical activities (management of change or scheduled overhaul)
- Operations management (establishing of dynamic risk registers).
This is the scope of a new EU funded research project called TOSCA and the present paper will introduce
the current framework being built.

1. Total Safety Management and SME in Europe
Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) have a high economic potential for European countries since
they provide many opportunities for employment and economic growth. Therefore, in the last decade,
there has been an increasing interest in occupational health and safety in SMEs accompanied by many
European projects supporting their viability (see European Agency for Safety and Health at Work report
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2005). The majority of studies in the literature have found that SMEs have an increased risk of accidents
compared to large enterprises. However, Sørensen et al. (2007) found that this relationship holds for
SMEs that are independent; in contrast, for SMEs that are part of larger organizations, the work
environment does not seem to present more hazards than the large enterprises. Another survey
conducted in Italy (i.e., 84 small-sized and 25 medium-sized enterprises responded to a questionnaire)
reported on the importance of SMEs’ perception of safety and identified current safety management
priorities and methods. Micheli and Cagno (2009) found that, although 80 % of SMEs claimed that safety
was among their main priorities, they reported problems in planning safety interventions because of limited
financial resources, lack of management tools and a burden of compliance with regulations and codes.
SMEs focused their investments on issues associated with purely regulatory or legislative aspects, that is,
(1) training and information of workers on safety, (2) upgrading installations to comply with safety
standards, and (3) introducing safer production technologies and personal protective equipment. A
tendency was observed among SMEs to outsource safety management to compensate for the lack of
specific competences within the enterprise; this tendency was greater in small-sized enterprises. Therefore
addressing their capacity to risk assess actual operation with an easy to apply resilient methodology and
provide the capacity to monitor and record data on the operations in a solution to be embedded in their
routine data collection can offer significant benefits in terms of their capacity to improve safety and
performance.

2. The issues of SMEs safety management systems in Europe and the TOSCA project
The Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities (TOSCA) project is a European Project
within the context of the 7th Framework Programme aimed at developing an innovative approach to
integrate and enhance safety, quality and productivity especially for SMe in the process industry.
The scope of TOSCA is to work out a well established and economically suitable framework in which the
most innovative tools and techniques (advanced 3D software, virtual reality, innovative theoretical models,
updated information exchange protocols etc) are operated together in order to get advantage on the
possible synergies in processing standards requirements, fulfil regulations, improve safety and enhance
productivity. As part of it the project is developing a theoretical framework for Total Safety Management in
the process industry particularly focused on SME applications .
To better define and highlight the needs of the industry regarding the development of an integrated
methodology for assessing safety, quality and operations management. the partners of the project
examined the most appropriate methods to elicit the required information in an effective way. The use of a
survey and more in depth face to face interviews were the two approaches chosen to assess the present
situation of the industrial installations handling toxic and flammable substances. Through both methods it
has been possible to enquire current practices and needs in relation to the range of methods, standards
and best practices used for safety, quality and operations management.
The two streams of work have been able to provide a multifaceted view of the current status quo: a) on the
one hand the development of and interview guide and the execution of a significant number of interviews
at the end-users’ premises by the partners of the consortium and b) on the other hand the development of
an on-line survey (questionnaire) to be remotely completed by interested end users together with the
elaboration of the data collected (a still on-going procedure) along with the organisation of three
workshops, one with representatives of the Greek industrial communities and two with the WP2 project
partners.
Challenges in carrying out systematic risk assessments
Since TOSCA places an important emphasis on the development of risk assessment methodologies that
would be also suitable for SMEs, the partners also investigated some challenges in implementing such
methods in the industry. Hardy (2010) has provided a synthesis of the challenges encountered by SMEs
and large industrial companies both in aviation and process industries. Table 4 presents some of the
challenges in implementing a systematic risk assessment methodology particularly in SMEs. These
challenges should provide a basis for face-to-face interviews of TOSCA partners with SME managers and
safety personnel. The list of challenges can also guide the development of risk assessment methods in
later activities of the project.Another study that is worth reporting regards the application of risk
assessment methods in the gas and oil companies in Norway. Andersen and Mostue (2012) carried out a
survey of 41 petroleum companies (mainly large companies), 15 engineering companies (mainly SMEs)
and 43 risk consultants to examine the challenges in applying risk analysis in the petroleum industry.
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Table 1: Challenges in implementing risk assessments in SMEs and large companies (Hardy, 2010)
SMS component

Challenges in safety management

Hazard identification

Failure to consider common cause conditions
Failure to consider hazards related to maintenance
Failure to consider the impact of human error
Failure to consider hazards related to organizational and management
issues
Failure to update the analysis after design changes
Failure to update the analysis as the procedures change

Risk assessment

Lack of standardization of risk matrices
Making unrealistic assumptions about the system and operations
Focusing on the worst credible event and ignoring more likely but less
severe events
Failure to recognize when risks are not independent
Failure to update the risk analysis after changes in the design or
procedures

Risk reduction

Redundancy and other controls can add complexity which can reduce
safety
Active controls can introduce complications when compared to passive
controls
Automated controls can reduce operator effectiveness in an
emergency
Common causes can defeat redundancy in controls
Risk controls can increase operator workload

The results can be summarized below:
• Risk analysis methods were mostly used in the design and modification stages – and not during daily
operations
• Daily generation of knowledge regarding plant risks did not build on formal risk analysis methods
• There were ambiguous opinions about the impact of new information technologies on the risk picture
• Limited focus on human and organizational factors in risk analysis

3. TOSCA Challenges to address TSM needs for SMEs
TOSCA shall have to address many of these challenges facing SMEs in managing safety. First, there is a
need to motivate SMEs to invest in safety management and show that there is a business case for safety.
For instance, Antonelli et al. (2006) proposed that the following factors can motivate SMEs to put capital
investment into the health and safety:
•
Interpreting SHE issues as an integral part of doing ‘good business’
•
Maintaining reputation
•
Achieving higher productivity
•
Keeping within the law, hence avoiding punitive action from government
•
Avoiding cost of accidents
•
Containing insurance costs
• Meeting client demands
•
Being a ‘good’ employer
Second, TOSCA risk assessment methodologies should be practical and user-friendly to SMEs so that
safety practitioners can master them easily and apply them during safety critical activities. An effort should
also be made to tailor risk assessment methods so that they can be used on a daily basis – e.g.,
operational risk management – for safety briefings in operational and maintenance tasks.
Third, formal risk assessment methods are useful but there is a need to adopt a resilience –based
approach in order to support front-line operators in improving their knowledge of risks and in providing
feedback to upper levels of the organization (Andersen and Mostue, 2012).
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Fourth, TOSCA tools should provide specific indicators for monitoring how successful the safety
interventions are for the management of change. The tools should demonstrate that there is some intrinsic
benefit to the business of the SMEs. This is important because developing Environmental Health and
Safety (EHS) interventions for heterogeneous types of SMEs is difficult since they are hard to reach and
not easily motivated if the intervention has few evident benefits. In their report, Legg et al, (2009)
recommended that, for programs to be successful, managers and consultants in SMEs should:
• Focus on a particular industrial sector or risk
• Combine health and safety with other management goals
• Combine active interventions with practical documentation and tools
• Measure its adequacy by evaluations of their effects afterwards
• Have the active involvement of different actors (employers, employer associations, workers, trade
unions) in its planning and implementation
Finally, the IT tools of risk assessment and the virtual reality simulations of the working environment
should take into account several challenges identified by earlier studies (e.g., Table 1). Many European
SMEs are using complex technologies and operate in a competitive environment that increases ‘variability’
in the way that operations are carried out daily. Hence, TOSCA tools should have to cope with the
uncertainty of the systems of work and working environments of European SMEs.

4. THE TOSCA methodological approach to TSM
Following on the main critical operational areas identified in the analysis of the needs for total safety
management in SMEs and process industry in general within TOSCA it become clear that the following
interrelated aspects needed to be addressed:
1.
2.
3.

The use of innovative technologies for Functional analysis and Risk assessment
The use of innovative tehnology for design review and management of change (forboth plant
design and safety cirtical task review)
The use of innovative technology to enhance safety management of everyday operations

The different modules comprising the TOSCA TSM devised to address those aspects are illustrated in
Figure 1, and they are briefly introduced below.
4.1 Common Operational Picture.
The Common Operational Picture is the information and knowledge about the operational system used to
support risk assessment and safety management. It may be represented in different ways but should be
accessible to all stakeholders involved in a project in order to analyse and communicate risk, and to
support training and procedure design. In this deliverable the work has been concentrating on
understanding the current state of the art in tools and methods used to represent the system being
analysed, the tools used for risk assessment, and the form the risk registry whenever present may take.
This was done so as to highlight what aspects of the above safety critical organizations may need to
improve.
4.2 TSM for Design
This section is seeking to understand how risk is assessed at the design stage, specifically through formal
risk assessment techniques, dynamic risk modelling techniques, and rapid prototyping. Dynamic risk
modelling involves the development of a model of risk to calculate risk levels, compute performance
indictors, and perform sensitivity analysis of risk mitigation measures. Rapid prototyping involves the
creation of a representation (physical or virtual) of a system or component for evaluation purposes. The
scope is to understand how organisations may need to improve risk assessment at the design stage.
4.3 TSM for Critical Activities
The critical tasks considered are the phase of a project when major changes may be introduced to an
organisation, and this section seeks to understand how such changes are managed in order to reduce risk.
Some organisations may have a formal protocol to follow for managing change, while others may simply
use existing channels of communication and/or training. In the deliverable an attempt was made to
understand how organisations manage safety in defining and designing critical tasks and what their future
needs are for improvement in this area.
4.4 TSM for Operations
This section focuses on monitoring and management of risk during the operational phase. What is needed
is a clearer understanding of how risks are currently monitored, for example through incident reporting or
safety performance indicators (SPIs), how training is used to manage risk in the operational phase, and
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how changes are communicated outside of major projects/commissioning. We also seek to understand
how to address effectively future needs of organisations in these areas.

Figure 1: TOSCA Total Safety Management Framework (©copyright of TOSCA project consortium)

5. Conclusions: the current Test beds and the future development
To follow up the development and the testing of the TOSCA methodology in the three main sections and
the deployment of the tools to support It within the project we have currently chosen to develop 5 test beds
to test in the first phase the effectiveness of the proposed approaches in the areas identified.
The test beds chosen are the following:
1) The use of process mapping and task analysis to improve an SME risk assessment in the food
processing industry and as a cornerstone for participatory risk assessment procedure review and
training. This case is to test the deployment of Common operational picture and its implications in risk
assessment.
2) The establishment of a risk register and a set of SPI to support hazard identification and risk monitoring
in a company comprising several energy production plants. This is to test a better approach to risk
monitoring in the operational loop.
3) The development of a better 3D risk map for a company producing fertilizers based on a 3D model of
the plant to be sued as a better document management repository and a baseline for their safety
management systems and management of information around changes.
4) The use of Rapid prototyping and VR simulations to test possible alternatives in the design of a
procedure for water testing of LPG storage tanks and train contractors and operators on it.. To test the
use of innovative technology for design review.
5) The use of VR to review and train operators and contractors for loading and unloading of cryogenic
liquids. To test the use of innovative technology on review and training of safety critical tasks.
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The test beds are currently under development their review should occur around October of this year. After
this in the second stage of the project other test beds may be developed however the main efforts will be
put in revising the methods and tools used for them and customize them for a wider usability in the
community of practice. This will entail the development of cost benefits analysis for the developed test
beds and the deployment of collaborative customization for the proposed solutions. Collaborative
customization is where the business conducts a dialogue with the individual end users/customer to help
them articulate their needs, to identify the precise offering that fulfils those needs, and to make customized
products for them. This approach is appropriate for businesses whose users/customers cannot easily
articulate what they want and grow frustrated when forced to select from a plethora of options, therefore it
can be the most appropriate approach for supporting SMEs in facing ever new developments and
technologies in the area of total safety management as an emerging field.
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